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Abstract
This research argues that the rapid expansion of international trade in the second phase
of the industrial revolution has played a signiﬁcant role in the timing of demographic transi-
tions across countries and has thereby been a major determinant of the distribution of world
population and a prime cause of the Great Divergence in income per capita across countries in
the last two centuries. The theory suggests that international trade aﬀected the evolution of
economies asymmetrically. The gains from trade were channeled towards population growth
in non-industrial nations while in the industrial nations they were directed towards investment
in education and growth in output per capita. International trade enhanced the specialization
of industrial economies in the production of skilled intensive goods. The rise in the demand
for skilled labor induced an investment in the quality of the population, expediting the demo-
graphic transition, stimulating technological progress and further enhancing the comparative
advantage of these industrial economies in the production of skilled intensive goods. In non-
industrial economies, in contrast, the specialization in the production of unskilled intensive
goods that was brought about by international trade reduced the demand for skilled labor and
provided limited incentives to invest in population quality. The gains from trade were uti-
lized primarily for an increase in the size of the population. The demographic transition was
therefore delayed, increasing further the abundance of unskilled labor in these economies and
enhancing their comparative disadvantage in the production of skilled intensive goods. The
focus on the interaction between population growth and comparative advantage generates an
important new insight regarding the distribution of the gains from trade. The theory suggests
that even if trade equalizes output growth of the trading countries, (due to the terms of trade
eﬀect), income per capita of developed and less developed economies will diverge since in less
developed economies growth of total output will be generated primarily by population growth,
whereas in developed economies it will be generated by an increase in output per capita.
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01I n t r o d u c t i o n
The last two centuries have witnessed dramatic changes in the distribution of income and popula-
tion across the globe. There has been a ‘Great Divergence’ in income per capita among countries
and regions and an equally momentous transformation in the distribution of world population.1
Some regions have excelled in the growth of income per capita, while other regions have been
dominant in population growth. While the ratio of income per capita in Western Europe to that
in Asia has tripled, the ratio of Asian to European population has doubled.2
The Great Divergence in income per capita across regions that accompanied the take-oﬀ
from an epoch of stagnation to sustained economic growth is one of the most signiﬁcant mysteries
in the growth process. How does one account for the sudden take-oﬀ from stagnation to growth
in some countries in the world and the persistent stagnation in others? Why have the diﬀerences
in per capita incomes across countries increased so markedly in the last two centuries? Why has
the link between income per capita and population growth been so dramatically reversed in some
economies but not in others? Has the pace of transition to sustained economic growth in advanced
economies adversely aﬀected the process of development in less-developed economies?
The origin of the Great Divergence, depicted in Figure 1, has been a source of controversy
among economic historians. Institutional and cultural factors that facilitated the protection of
property rights and enhanced technological research and the diﬀusion of knowledge have been
advocated by David Landes (1998) and Joel Mokyr (2002), Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson
and James Robinson (2002) as the prime factors that permitted the European take-oﬀ.E r i c
L. Jones (1981,1988) has emphasized geographical factors that made Europe less vulnerable to
the risk associated with climate and diseases. Others, notably Kenneth Pomeranz (2000), have
suggested that the discovery of the New World enabled Europe, via Atlantic trade, to overcome
‘land constraints’ and to take-oﬀ technologically.
1In the time period 1820-1998, the ratio between income per capita in the richest region in the world (i.e.,
Western oﬀshoots - the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) and the poorest regions in the world
( i . e . ,A f r i c a )h a si n c r e a s e df r o ma b o u t3t o1 9[ M a d d i s o n ,2 0 0 1 ] .
2Over the period 1820-1998, the ratio between income per capita in Western European and Asian (excluding
Japan) grew 2.9 times, whereas the ratio between the Asian population (excluding Japan) and the Western European
population grew 1.7 times [Maddison, 2001].








































This research argues that the rapid expansion of international trade in the second phase of
the industrial revolution has played a major role in the timing of demographic transitions across
countries and has thereby been a signiﬁcant determinant of the distribution of world population
and a prime cause of the ‘Great Divergence’ in income levels across countries in the last two cen-
turies. The analysis suggests that international trade had an asymmetrical eﬀect on the evolution
of industrial and non-industrial economies. While in the industrial nations the gains from trade
were directed primarily towards investment in education and growth in output per capita, a signif-
icant portion of the gains from trade in non-industrial nations was channeled towards population
growth.
In the second phase of the Industrial Revolution, international trade enhanced the spe-
cialization of industrial economies in the production of industrial, skilled intensive, goods. The
associated rise in the demand for skilled labor has induced a gradual investment in the quality
of the population, expediting a demographic transition, stimulating technological progress and
further enhancing the comparative advantage of these industrial economies in the production of
skilled intensive goods. In non-industrial economies, in contrast, international trade has gen-
erated an incentive to specialize in the production of unskilled intensive, non-industrial, goods.
The absence of signiﬁcant demand for human capital has provided limited incentives to invest in
the quality of the population and the gains from trade have been utilized primarily for a further
2increase in the size of the population, rather than the income of the existing population. The de-
mographic transition in these non-industrial economies has been signiﬁcantly delayed, increasing
further their relative abundance of unskilled labor, enhancing their comparative disadvantage in
the production of skilled intensive goods and delaying their process of development. The research
suggests, therefore, that international trade aﬀected persistently the distribution of population,
skills, and technologies in the world economy, and has been a signiﬁcant force behind the ‘Great
Divergence’ in income per capita across countries.
The historical evidence described in the next section suggests that indeed the asymmetric
eﬀect of international trade on the timing of the demographic transition in developed and less-
developed economies, and its persistent eﬀect therefore on the initial patterns of comparative
advantage may be an important element behind the Great Divergence.3 The contrasting process of
development of the UK and India over the last two centuries is consistent with the theory proposed
in this paper and provides an interesting case study. During the nineteenth century the UK traded
manufactured goods for primary products with India.4 As documented in Table 1, industrialization
in India regressed over this century whereas industrialization in the UK accelerated. The process
of industrialization in the UK lead to a signiﬁcant increase in the demand for skilled labor in the
second phase of the industrial revolution, triggering a demographic transition and a transition to
a state of sustained economic growth. In India, in contrast, the lack of demand for skilled labor
delayed the demographic transition and the process of development. Thus, while the gains from
trade were utilized in the UK primarily towards an increase in output per capita, in India they
were channeled towards an increase in the size of the population.5
3Consistent with the viewpoint the trade has not been uniformly beneﬁcial across time and regions, recent
research has indicated that the relationship between openness and growth changed in the last century. For example
Michael Clemens and Jeﬀrey Williamson (2002) ﬁnd a positive relationship between average tariﬀ levels and growth
for the period 1870-1913 and a negative relationship for the period 1970-1998. Similarly Athanasios Vamvakadis
(2002) ﬁnds a positive relationship between several measures of openness and growth after 1970 and some evidence
of a negative relationship in the period 1870-1910.
4The colonial power of the UK may have encouraged the specialization of India in the production of primary
goods beyond the degree dictated by market forces. However, these forces would have just reinforced the adverse
eﬀects described in this paper. The theory is compatible with the case in which the patterns of specialization
are not determined by market forces but rather by the interaction between colonial forces and international trade
(e.g., Acemoglu at al. 2003). Colonialism reinforced the adverse eﬀect of international trade on the process of
industrialization of less developed economies, depressing the demand for human capital and enhancing the incentive
to convert the gains from trade into population growth rather than into an increase in output per capita.
5The theory further suggests that the near abstention of China from international trade during this period, delayed
its demographic transition, increased the level of its population and derailed its relative position in the world income
distribution. As documented in Table 1 and argued by David Landes (1998), the degree of industrialization in China,
which was in the midst of an epoch of isolationism and discouragement of international trade, was declining in this
period, despite being quite technologically advanced.
3Table 1. Per Capita Industrialization Levels6
1800 1860 1913 1953 1980
UK 16 64 115 210 325
Europe 8 17 45 90 267
India* 6 3 2 5 16
Another interesting case study providing supporting evidence for the proposed hypothesis is
the economic integration of the Israeli and the West Bank economies in the aftermath of the 1967
war. Trade and factor mobility between the skilled abundant economy of Israel and the unskilled
abundant economy of the West Bank shifted the West Bank economy toward further specialization
in the production of primary goods, and possibly triggered the astonishing increase in cruse births
rates from 22 per 1000 people in 1968 to 42 per 1000 in 1990, despite a decline in mortality rates.
The gains from trade and development in the West Bank economy were converted primarily into
an increase in population size, nearly doubling the population in those two decades.7
This paper develops a uniﬁed growth theory that captures the asymmetric role that in-
ternational trade may have played in expediting the transition to sustained economic growth
in technologically advanced economies and in delaying the transition in technologically inferior
economies. The theory suggests that sustained diﬀerences in income and population growth across
countries may be attributed to the contrasting role that international trade had on industrial and
non-industrial nations.
The proposed theory is innovative in two dimensions. First, unlike the recent literature on
the transition of economies from an epoch of Malthusian stagnation to state of sustained economic
growth that abstracted from the emergence Great Divergence and focused on the evolution of the
world economy from stagnation to growth,8 the proposed theory examines the diﬀerential patterns
6Source: Bairoch (1982). The Index is normalized at 100 = UK at 1900. India is measured using its boundaries
in 1913.
7Estimates of the growth rates of output per capita over this period. are less reliable and suggest that hte increase
was about 30%. Consistent with the proposed theory, the Palestinian uprising in the early 1990s and the gradual
disintegration of the two economies resulted in the reduction in the crude birth rates.
8In particular, Oded Galor and David N. Weil (1999, 2000) argue that the inherent positive interaction between
population and technology during theM a l t h u s i a nr e g i m ei n c r e a s e dt h er a t eo ft e c h n o l o g i c a lp r o g r e s ss u ﬃciently
so as to induce investment in human capital that led to further technological progress, a demographic transition,
4of takeoﬀs across regions in the world and the emergence of the Great Divergence.9 Second, in
contrast to the recent literature on the dynamics of comparative advantage,10 the focus on the
interaction between population growth and comparative advantage and the persistent eﬀect that
this interaction may have on the distribution of population and income in the world economy
generates an important new insight regarding the distribution of the gains from trade.11 The
theory suggests that even if trade equalizes output growth of the trading countries, (due to the
terms of trade eﬀect),12 income per capita of developed and less developed economies will diverge
since in less developed economies growth of total output will be generated primarily by population
growth, whereas in developed economies it will be generated by an increase in output per capita.
The theory is based on several fundamental elements. The interaction between these ele-
ments generates a dynamic pattern that is consistent with the observed asymmetrical evolution
of the world economy from the epoch of Malthusian stagnation to the current era of sustained
growth, characterized by widened international diﬀerences in income per capita and population
growth rates, as well as by persistent patterns of comparative advantage.
Economies are initially in a Malthusian epoch in which the growth rate of output per
capita is rather small and population growth is positively related to the level of income per
capita. Technological progress leads ultimately to the adoption of more advanced agricultural and
industrial technologies which paves the way for the take-oﬀ from the Malthusian epoch.
International trade induces technologically advanced economies to specialize in the produc-
tion of skilled intensive manufactured goods whereas technologically inferior economies specialize
in the production of unskilled intensive agricultural goods. The increase in the demand for human
capital in the technologically advanced economies that is brought about by international trade
and sustained economic growth. Oded Galor and Omer Moav (2002) argue that natural selection is the origin
of economic growth. suggests that the transition from stagnation to growth reﬂects a transition from a stagnating
agricultural economy to a growing industrial economy. Other recent growth models that capture some aspects of the
long transition from stagnation to growth include Marvin Goodfriend and John McDermott (1995), Robert Lucas
(2002), Gary Hansen and Edward Prescott (2002), Tomas Kogel and Alexia Prskawetz (2001), John McDermott
(2002), Matthias Doepke (2002), Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde (2002), Nils-Petter Lagerloef (2003), among others.
9Krugman and Venables (1995) and Baldwin et al. (2001) argued that the reduction in transportation and the
associated expansion in trade, generated geographically based industrialization and divergence. Peter Howitt and
David Mayer-Foulkes (2002) suggests that the deferential timing in the introduction of the R&D labs across countries
is a source of divergence.
10See , Ronald Findlay and Henryk Kierzkowski (1983) Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1991) and Kiminori
Matsuyama, Alwyn Young (1991), among others.
11Deardorﬀ (1994) examine the eﬀect of diﬀering population growth rates on the world distribution of income
in an international context. These papers show how diverging (exogenous) population growth rates can lead to
widening international inequality.
12See for example Acemoglu and Ventura (2002).
5induces investment in the human capital13 and expedites the demographic transition, whereas the
reduction in the demand for human capital in less advanced economies delays the demographic
transition and investment in human capital.14
The analysis demonstrates that the acceleration of the demographic transition in the tech-
nologically advanced economies increases their formation of human capital and brings about sus-
tained technological progress,15 that enhances their comparative advantage in the production of
skilled intensive industrial goods.16 In contrast, the delay in the demographic transition in the
less advanced economies increases the supply of unskilled workers and enhances the comparative
advantage of these economies in the production of unskilled intensive goods. Thus, the historical
patterns of international trade reinforced the initial patterns of comparative advantage and has
generated a persistent eﬀect on the distribution of population in the world economy and a great
divergence in income per capita across countries and regions. The evidence indicates that the
rapid transition of the currently developed economies into a state of sustained economic growth
may have been related to the slow transition of less developed economies into a state of sustained
economic growth.
2 Historical Evidence
This section provides historical evidence that demonstrates that the fundamental hypothesis of
this research is consistent with the process of development of the last two centuries, with particular
reference to the diverging experience of the UK and India since the 19th century in terms of the
levels of income per capita levels and population growth rates.
The evidence demonstrates during the nineteenth century the UK traded manufactured
13Consistent with empirical evidence, the increased demand for human capital has not resulted necessarily in
an increase in the equilibrium rate of return to human capital due to a massive supply response generated by (a)
the increase in the incentive for investment in education (for a given cost), and (b) institutional changes (e.g., the
provision of public education) that lowered the cost of investment in human capital. See, Goldin and Katz (1998)
for evidence regarding technology-skill complementarity during the 20th century.
14Unlike Becker [1981]’s hypothesis that a high level of income induces parents to switch to having fewer, higher
quality children, the substitution of quality for quantity in this paper is in response to technological progress. The
fact that demographic transitions occurred around the same period in Western European countries that diﬀered in
their income per capita, but shared a similar pattern of future technological progress, supports our technological
approach.
15This link between education and technological change was proposed by Richard R. Nelson and Edmund S.
Phelps [1966]. For supportive evidence see Easterlin (1981) and Mark Doms, Timothy Dunne, and Kenneth R.
Troske (1997).
16Consistent with the thesis that human capital has reinforced the existing patterns of comparative advantage,
Taylor (1999) argues that human capital accumulation during the late Nineteenth Century was not a source of
convergence even among the advanced ‘ Greater Atlantic’ trading economies. The richer economies - U.S.A. and
Australia — had greater levels of school enrollments than the poorer ones, Denmark and Sweden.
6goods for primary products with India.17 Consistent with the proposed hypothesis, industrial-
ization in India regressed over this century whereas industrialization in the UK accelerated. The
process of industrialization in the UK lead to a signiﬁcant increase in the demand for skilled labor
in the second phase of the industrial revolution, triggering a demographic transition and a transi-
tion to a state of sustained economic growth. In India, in contrast, the lack of demand for skilled
labor delayed the demographic transition and the process of development. Thus, while the gains
from trade were utilized in the UK primarily towards an increase in output per capita, in India
they were channeled towards an increase in the size of the population.
2.1 North-South Trade and Industrialization
Consistent with the main hypothesis of this research, during the 19th century, North-South trade,
as well as North-North trade, expanded signiﬁcantly due to a rapid industrialization in Northwest
Europe as well as the reduction of trade barriers and transportation costs and the beneﬁts of the
gold standard. The ratio of world trade to output was about 2% in 1800, but then it rose to 10%
in 1870, to 17% in 1900 and 21% in 1913 [Antoni Estavadeordal, Brian Frantz and Alan M. Taylor,
2002)]. While much of this trade occurred between industrial economies a signiﬁcant proportion
was between industrial and non-industrial economies. As shown in Table 2 before 1900 nearly 50%
of manufactured exports were to non-European and non-North American economies. By the end
of 19th Century a clear pattern of specialization had emerged. The UK and Northwest Europe
were net importers of primary products and net exporters of manufactured goods, whereas the
exports of Asia, Oceania, Latin America and Africa were overwhelmingly composed of primary
products. [Ronald Findlay and Kevin O’Rourke, 2001].
Atlantic trade as well as trade with Asia, in an era of colonialism, had major eﬀects on
European growth starting in the late 16th century [Acemoglu et al., 2003]. Furthermore, later
expansion of international trade contributed further to the process of industrialization in the
UK and Europe (Joel Mokyr, 1985, and O’Rourke Kevin H. and Jeﬀrey G. Williamson, 1999).
For the UK, the proportion of foreign trade to national income grew from about 10% in the
1780’s to about 26% in the period 1837-45, and 51.5% in the period 1909-13. [Simon Kuznets,
1967]. Other European economies experienced a similar pattern as well. The proportion of foreign
trade to national income on the eve of World War I was 53.7% in France, 38.3% in Germany
, 33.8% in Italy, and 40.4% in Sweden. [Simon Kuznets, 1967, Table 4]. Furthermore, exports
17As argued earlier, the colonial power of the UK may have encouraged the specialization of India in the production
of primary goods beyond the degree dictated by market forces reinforcing the adverse eﬀe c t sd e s c r i b e di nt h i sp a p e r .
7were critical for the viability of some industries, especially the cotton industry, where 70% of the
UK output was exported in the 1870’s [Mokyr, 1985]. Thus while technological advances could
have spawned the industrial revolution without an expansion of international trade, the growth in
exports increased the pace of industrialization and the growth rate of output per capita. Moreover,
Kenneth Pomeranz (2000), provides historical evidence for the vital role of trade in the ‘take oﬀ’
of the European economies. He argues that technological and development diﬀerences between
Europe and Asia were minor around 1750, but the discovery of the New World enabled Europe,
via Atlantic trade, to overcome ‘land constraints’ and to take-oﬀ technologically.18
Non-industrialized economies were an important market for the export of the industrial
economies, as exhibited in Table 2. Trade with Asia was especially signiﬁcant for Britain. Accord-
ing to Paul Bairoch (1974) trade with Asia constituted over 20% of UK total exports throughout
the nineteenth century. In contrast, trade with Asia was only 5% or less of French, German or
Italian exports. UK imports from Asia were also much more important for the UK than for Eu-
rope. Bairoch estimates that 23.2% of UK imports were originated in Asian countries in 1860 as
compared with 12.1% for continental Europe.
Table 2. Regional Shares of World Trade in Manufactures
Source: Yates (1959)
1876-1880 1896-1900 1913
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
U.K. and Ireland 37.8% 9.1% 31.5% 10.4% 25.3% 8.2%
Northwest Europe 47.1% 18.1% 45.8% 20.3% 47.9% 24.4%
Other Europe 9.2% 13.3% 10.3% 12.2% 8.3% 15.4%
U.S. and Canada 4.4% 7.7% 7.4% 9.6% 10.6% 12.1%
Rest of the World 1.5% 51.8% 5.0% 47.5% 7.9% 39.9%
For India, however, international trade played the reverse role. As Chaudhuri (1983) de-
scribes 1813-1850 was a period of a rapid expansion in the volume of exports and imports which
gradually transformed India from being an exporter of manufactured products — largely textiles
— into a supplier of primary commodities. Trade with the UK was fundamental in this process,
as Table 3 demonstrates, with the UK supplying over two thirds of its imports for most of the
nineteenth century and being the market for over a third of its exports. Bairoch’s (1974, 1982)
analysis of international levels of industrialization and international trade supports the viewpoint
18Clark and Feenstra (2001) establish that most of the Great Divergence occurred in the last two centuries and
it is originated by diﬀerences in labor eﬃciency across countries. Moreover, they argue that international trade
patterns reﬂected these diﬀerences in labor eﬃciency.
8that international trade was associated with a decrease in the per capita level of industrialization
in India. As Table 1 suggests, the rapid industrialization in the UK in the nineteenth century was
associated with a decline in the per capita level of industrialization in India. Furthermore, Bairoch
(1974) found that industries that employed new technologies made up between 60 and 70 percent
of the UK manufacturing industry in 1860 but less than 1 percent of manufacturing industries in
the developing countries.19
Table 3. Share of the Value of British Trade in Total Value of Indian Trade20
1828-9 1839-40 1850-1 1860-1 1880-1 1900-1 1920-1 1940-1
Exports 48.2% 57.1% 44.6% 43.1% 41.6% 29.8% 22.1% 34.7%
Imports 65.0% 75.7% 72.1% 84.8% 82.9% 65.6% 60.9% 22.9%
2.2 Industrialization, Population Growth and the Demographic Transition
For the major part of human existence economies appear to have been in a state of Malthusian
stagnation. Diminishing returns to labor along with a positive eﬀect of the standard of living on
the growth rate of population provided a self equilibrating role for the size of the population in a
stationary economic environment. Changes in the technological environment or in the availability
of land led to larger but not richer population. The growth rate of output per capita had been
negligible over time and the standard of living had not diﬀered greatly across countries. For
instance, the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita in both Western Europe and India
in the years 0-1000 was nearly zero and only 0.14% for Western Europe and 0.02% for India in
the years 1000-1820 (Angus Maddison, 2001). Similarly, the pattern of population growth over
this era followed the Malthusian pattern. The average annual rate of population growth in both
Western Europe and India was 0% between the years 0 and 1000 and 0.2% for Western Europe and
0.13% for India in the years 1000-1820 (Maddison, 2001). World population grew at an average
pace of less than 0.1% per year from the year 1 to 1750 (Massimo Livi-Bacci, 1997), reﬂecting the
slow pace of resource expansion and technological progress. Fluctuations in population and wages
also reﬂected the structure of the Malthusian regime. Negative shocks to population, such as the
Black Death, were reﬂected in higher real wages and faster population growth. Finally, diﬀerences
in technology were reﬂected in population density but not in standards of living. Prior to 1800
19This contrasts with the experience of the non-UK European economies which produced more of the ‘new
technology’ goods and which traded with themselves to a greater extent, (Bairoch, 1974).
20Source: K.N. Chaudhuri (1983)
9diﬀerences in standard of living between countries were relatively small despite the existence of
wide diﬀerences in technology (Richard Easterlin, 1981, and Lucas, 2002).
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The emergence from Malthusian stagnation in Europe as a whole was initially very slow,
(Maddison, 2001). During this slow transition, the Malthusian mechanism linking higher income
to higher population growth continued to function, but the reduction in resources per capita
caused by higher population was counteracted by technological progress, which allowed per capita
income to keep rising. The average growth of output per capita over the period 1820-1870 rose
to an annual rate of 1.0 percent along with an impressive increase in education.21 As depicted in
Figure 2, during this time interval, fertility rates increased in most of Western Europe until the
second half of the nineteenth century (Tim Dyson and Mike Murphy, 1985, and Ansley J. Coale
and Roy Treadway, 1986).22 Furthermore, the acceleration in technological progress increased the
return to human capital and ultimately triggered a demographic transition in which fertility rates
declined rapidly, paving the way to an era of sustained economic growth.23 The level of resources
21See the next section, but for example, the average number of years of schooling in England and Wales rose
from 2.3 for the cohort born between 1801 and 1805 to 5.2 for the cohort born 1852-56 and 9.1 for the cohort born
1897-1906. (Robert C. O. Matthews, Charles H. Feinstein, and John C. Odling-Smee, 1982).
22In addition, as living standards rose, mortality fell. Between the 1740s and the 1840s, life expectancy at birth
rose from 33 to 40 in England and from 25 to 40 in France (Livi-Bacci, 1997). Mortality reductions led to growth of
the population both because more children reached breeding age and because each person lived for a larger number
of years.
23The reduction in fertility was most rapid in Europe around the turn of the century. In England, for example,
live births per 1000 women aged 15-44 fell from 153.6 in 1871-80 to 109.0 in 1901-10 (Wrigley, 1969). The exception
was France, where fertility started to decline in the early 19th century.
10invested in each child increased and population growth fell, bringing about a sustained average
annual increase in income per capita of 2.2 percent over the period 1929-1990.
The evolution of population in the UK and India was characterized by these three distinct
phases as well. In the Malthusian phase population increased but income per capita remained
roughly constant, in the early take-oﬀ the growth of income per capita and population increased
and in the modern stage a demographic transition takes place and the rate of population growth
falls while income per capita rises. Figure 3 shows that in the UK, population growth increased
rapidly during the industrial revolution before declining sharply in the twentieth century. Western
Europe has a similar although less dramatic pattern. In contrast India has not until recently
experienced a rapid increase in industrialization and have seen population growth increase with
income in a Malthusian manner.































This delay in the demographic transition in India, lead according to the proposed theory to the
divergence between UK and India depicted in Figure 4.
11Figure 4:   The Great Divergence: 
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2.3 Industrialization and Human Capital Accumulation
The process of industrialization in the UK was characterized by a gradual increase in the relative
importance of human capital accumulation. In the ﬁrst phase of the Industrial Revolution (1760-
1830), capital accumulation as a fraction of GNP increased signiﬁcantly whereas literacy rates
remained largely unchanged. Skills and literacy requirements had been minimal and the state
devoted virtually no resources to raise the level of literacy of the masses, and economic growth
was not impeded by educational retardation.24 Workers developed skills primarily through on-the-
job training, and child labor was highly valuable. Consequently, literacy rates had not increased
during the period 1750-1830 (Sanderson, 1995, pp. 2-10). The requirements for technical skills
in that period, were slight and adequately met by traditional means (Green, 1990, pp. 293-294).
As argued by Landes (1969, p 340) “although certain workers - supervisory and oﬃce personnel
in particular - must be able to read and do the elementary arithmetical operations in order to
perform their duties, large share of the work of industry can be performed by illiterates as indeed
it was especially in the early days of the industrial revolution.”25
24As argued by Mitch (1992 pp. 14-15), during the ﬁrst stages of the Industrial Revolution, literacy was largely a
cultural skill or a hierarchy symbol that had limited value in the labor market. For instance, in 1841 only 4.9% of
m a l ew o r k e r sa n do n l y2 . 2 %o ff e m a l ew o r k e r sw e r ei no c c u p a t i o n si nw h i c hl i t e r a c yw a ss t r i c t l yr e q u i r e d .
25Furthermore, some have argued that the low skill requirements have even declined over this period. For instance,
Sanderson (1972, p. 89) suggests that “One thus ﬁnds the interesting situation of an emerging economy creating a
whole range of new occupations which require even less literacy and education than the old ones.”
12In the second phase of the industrial revolution, industrialization causes an increase in
the demand for human capital by the industrial sector.26 Capital accumulation subsided, the
education of the labor force markedly increased and skills became necessary for production.27
The investment ratio increased from 6 percent in 1760 to 11.7 percent in the year 1831, but it
remained around 11% on average in the period 1856-1913 (Crafts 1985, p. 73 and Matthews
et al 1982, p. 137).28 In contrast, the second half of the nineteenth century was marked by a
great expansion of education in the UK. The average years of schooling of the male labor force of
England which did not change signiﬁcantly until 1830s, tripled by the beginning of the twentieth
century [Matthews et al (1982), p 573] and school enrollment at the age of 10 increased from 40%
in 1870 to 100% in 1900 [West, 1985]. This increase in human capital investment was in part
a response to an increase in demand for skilled labor by industrialists. The British government
responded to this demand by setting up in 1868 the Parliamentary Select Committee on Scientiﬁc
Education which lead to the 1870 Education Act and the 1902 Balfour Act - the education reform
in England that marked the consolidation of a national education system and the creation of a
publicly supported secondary school system.
A similar pattern occurred in other European countries as well as in the USA and Canada.
As argued by Abramovitch (1993 p.224) “In the nineteenth century, technological progress was
heavily biased in a physical capital-using direction. ... In the twentieth century, however, the
physical capital-using bias weakened; it may have disappeared altogether. The bias shifted in
an intangible (human and knowledge) capital-using direction and produced the substantial con-
tribution of education and other intangible capital accumulation to this century’s productivity
growth...”. Indeed, evidence provided by Goldin and Katz (2001) and Abramovitz and David
(2000) suggests that over the period 1890-1999 in the United States the contribution of human
capital accumulation to the growth process nearly doubled whereas the contribution of physical
26Hence the lack of non-controversial evidence about the increase in the return to skilled labor in the second phase
of the industrial revolution should not raise doubts about the validity of the proposed mechanism. The increased
demand for human capital has not resulted necessarily in an increase in the return to human capital due to a
signiﬁcant increase in the supply of skilled workers that was generated by institutional changes (e.g., the provision
of public education) that lowered the cost of investment in human capital and by the increase in the incentive for
investment in education.
27From the 1850s, job advertisements suggest that literacy has become an increasingly desired characteristic for
employment (Mitch, 1993, p. 292).
28The emergence of human capital as a prime engine of economic growth in the second phase of the Industrial
Revolution, channeled resources towards investment in human capital as well as investment in physical capital.
Consequently, although aggregate investment in human and physical capital had increased, measured saving rates
(where national accounts consider investment in education as expenditure) remained constant.
13capital declined signiﬁcantly.29
Education was not expanded to a similar degree in India in the 19th Century. As noted by
Aparna Basu (1974), during the nineteenth century the state of education in India was charac-
terized by a relatively large university sector, aimed at producing skilled bureaucrats rather than
industrialists, alongside widespread illiteracy of the masses. The literacy rate was very low, (e.g.,
10% in Bengal in 1917-8) but nevertheless, attempts to expand primary education in the twentieth
century were hampered by poor attendance and high drop out rates, which may suggest that the
rate of return to education was relatively low. The lack of broad based education in India can also
be seen using the data of Barro and Lee (2000). Despite an expansion of education throughout the
twentieth century Barro and Lee report that in 1960 72.2 percent of Indians aged 15 and above
had “no schooling” compared with 2 percent in the UK.
3A n A u t a r k i c E c o n o m y
This section analyzes the path of a closed economy from its Malthusian pre-industrial state through
a transitional state of increased fertility, investment in human capital and economic growth to
a modern state with high investment in human capital, low population growth, and sustained
economic growth.
Consider an overlapping generations economy in which economic activity extends over in-
ﬁnite discrete time. In every period t two goods, a manufactured good, Y m
t , and an agricultural
good Y a
t , may be produced using up to three factors of production, skilled labor, Ht, unskilled la-
bor, Lt, and land, X. The supply of skilled and unskilled labor are endogenously determined and
evolve over time, whereas the quantity of land is exogenously determined and remains constant
over time.
3.1 Production
In each of the sectors of the economy production may take place with either an old technology
or a new one. In early stages of development the new production technologies are latent and
29Goldin and Katz (2001) show that the rate of growth of educational productivity was 0.29% per year over the
period 1890-1915, accounting for about 11% of the 1.8% annual growth rate of output per capita over this period. In
the period 1915-1999, the rate of growth of educational productivity was 0.53% per year accounting for about 20%
of the 1.8% annual growth rate of output per capita over this period. (The labor share is assumed to be 0.7 over the
entire period.) Abramovitz and David (2000) report that the fraction of the growth rate of output per capita that is
directly attributed to physical capital accumulation has declined from an average of 56% in the period 1800-1890 to
31% in 1890-1927 and 21% in the period 1929-1966. Similarly, Denison (1962, p 270) suggests that the contribution
of capital accumulation accounted for 22% of the growth rate in output per capita in the period 1909 - 1929 and
9% in the period 1929-1957, whereas the contribution of human capital accounted for 15% and 21%, respectively.
14production is conducted using the old technologies. However, in the process of development the
productivity of the new technologies grows faster than those of the old technologies and ultimately
the new technologies become economically viable. In the agricultural sector the introduction of the
new technology represents the escape from the Malthusian trap, where wages do not fall despite
an increase in population. In the industrial sector the introduction of the new technology reﬂects
an increase in the skill-intensity of the production process in the second phase of the industrial
revolution and the associated increase in the demand for human capital.
3.1.1 Production of the Agricultural Good
The agricultural good can be produced by either an old technology or a new one. The output of








t )γX1−γ;0 < γ < 1, (1)
where L
a,0
t is the amount of unskilled labor and X i st h ea m o u n to fl a n de m p l o y e di np e r i o dt in
the production of the agricultural good using the old technology, and aa
t is the level of productivity
of the old technology in period t. For simplicity the amount of land is normalized such that X =1 .
The output of the agricultural good produced with the new technology in period t, Y
a,N
t ,









t is the amount of unskilled labor employed in the production of the agricultural good
in period t using the new technology, and Aa
t is the level of productivity of the new technology in
period t. Appendix B demonstrates that the qualitative analysis remains intact if the agricultural
sector remains land-intensive.
As will become apparent, in the early stages of development when the productivity of the
new technology, Aa
t, is low relative to the productivity of the old technology, aa
t, only the old
technology will be employed. However in later stages of development, when Aa
t rises suﬃciently
relative to aa
t, the new technology becomes economically viable.
30This production function is designed to capture the decline in the importance of land in mature state of devel-
opment. However, the qualitative analysis would remain intact if the agricultural technology remains land-intensive,
as established in Appendix B. Some economic historians have argued the Industrial Revolution was preceded by an
agricultural revolution (e.g., Allen, Robert C., 1999) and the that total factor productivity in English agriculture at
least tripled between 1300 and 1850 (Clark, 1991).
153.1.2 Production of the Manufactured Good
The manufactured good can be produced by either an old technology or a new one. The output











t is the amount of unskilled labor employed in period t in the production of the man-
ufactured good using the old technology, and am
t is the level of productivity of the old industrial
technology in period t.31
The output of the manufactured good produced with the modern technology in period t,
Y
m,N





















t are the amounts of unskilled labor and skilled labor employed in the production
of the industrial good in period t using the new technology.
As will become apparent, in early stages of development when the technological level Am
t
is low relative to am
t only the old industrial technology is economically viable. However in the
process of development as Am
t rises suﬃciently relative to am
t , it becomes proﬁtable for producers
to employ the new industrial technology.
3.1.3 Factor Prices and Goods’ Prices
Producers operate in perfectly competitive markets for ﬁnal goods and for labor. In the absence
of property rights to land, the return to land is zero and workers in the agricultural sector who
use the old technology receive their average products.32


















31The incorporation of capital would not aﬀect the qualitative results, but will complicate the analysis considerably.
32Since the fundamental mechanism explored in this paper focuses on the role of human capital accumulation and
the demographic transition, rather than the role of capital and asset accumulation, in the process of development
and in the emergence of sustained economic growth, this is a natural simplifying assumption. (See Galor and Weil
(2000)). One could alternatively assume that the economy uses capital as a factor of production in agriculture and
is small and open or that land is collectively owned and the proceeds distributed lump sum across the population.
Allowing for capital accumulation and property rights to land in a closed economy context would complicate the
model to the point of intractability.
16where wu
t is the wage of an unskilled labor in terms of the manufactured good, and pt as the
relative price of the agricultural good in terms of the manufactured good in period t.
The inverse demand for skilled and unskilled labor in the manufactured sector, given (3)
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t ) = ω(hm
t )i fY
m,N
t > 0, (8)
where as follows from the neoclassical properties of f(hm
t ), ω0(hm
t ) < 0.
Since unskilled workers are mobile between the agricultural and the industrial sectors, the
wages of unskilled labor in both sectors are equal if both goods are produced. As follows from (5)
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3.2 Individuals: Fertility, Human Capital and Consumption
Individuals live for two periods. In their ﬁrst period of life they consume a fraction of their parental
unit time endowment; educated oﬀspring require a larger fraction of parental time. In their second
period of life they are endowed with one unit of time which they optimally allocate between child
rearing and labor force participation.
3.2.1 Preferences and Budget Constraints
Individuals make optimal decisions over fertility, consumption and the training of their oﬀspring
(Becker (1976)). Individuals face subsistence consumption constraint that they must consume a
subsistence level of the agricultural good, e c.33
33As will become apparent, the presence of a subsistence consumption constraint generates the Malthusian positive
income elasticity of population growth at low income levels.
17Individual’s preferences are deﬁned over consumption and the potential aggregate income
of their children. The preferences of a member of generation t (i.e. an individual who is born in










t are the consumption of the agricultural good and the consumption of the manufac-
tured good respectively. Σ{i=s,u}wi
t+1ni is the total potential income of the individual’s oﬀspring
where ns
t is the number of oﬀspring trained to be skilled workers, nu
t is the number of oﬀspring
trained to be unskilled workers, and ws
t+1,a n dwu
t+1 are the wages paid to skilled and unskilled
oﬀspring in period t +1 .35
Individuals optimally allocate their time between labor force participation and child rearing.
They further optimally choose both the number and quality of children and the amount of each
good to consume. Denoting the time required to bring up a skilled oﬀspring as, τs,a n dt h et i m e
required to bring up unskilled oﬀspring as, τu,w h e r eτs > τu, the budget constraint of a member
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3.2.2 Optimization
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t;
ca
t ≥ e c.
The optimization depends on whether the subsistence consumption constraint is binding. If
income was high enough, the constraint would not bind and the log-linearity of the utility function
34A Stone-Geary utility function of the form: ut =( c
a














identical qualitative results. The second component of the utility function may represent either intergenerational
altruism, or implicit concern about potential support from children in old age. The interpretation that emphasizes
intergenerational altruism reﬂects an implicit bounded rationality on the part of the parent. Alternative formulations
according to which individuals generate utility from the utility of their children, or from the actual aggregate income
of their oﬀspring would require parental predictions about fertility choices of their dynasty. These approaches would
greatly complicate the model and we conjecture that they would not aﬀect the qualitative results.
35Modeling education as a discrete variable is a natural assumption given the two-sector international trade
structure of model. Alternatively education could be modeled as a continuous choice variable, as in Galor and Weil
(2002). This would result in an optimal level of education that all agents would choose. Countries would diﬀer in
this level of skill-intensity and hence in their productivity and their comparative advantage.
18would imply that ﬁxed shares of potential income are devoted to child rearing and consuming each
of the two goods. However if the subsistence consumption constraint binds then a greater share
of potential income must be devoted to agricultural consumption.
The consumption of the agricultural good, ca
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(11)
The consumption of the manufactured good, cm
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(12)
Furthermore, the number of educated and uneducated oﬀspring will be determined such that the
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3.3 Education and Fertility Decisions
This section demonstrates that in early stages of development, when the technological level is
relatively low, individuals do not have an incentive to invest in the human capital of their oﬀspring.
However, as the level of technology improves in the process of development, the new industrial
technology will ultimately become economically viable, human capital will be demanded and
individuals will have an incentive to invest in the human capital of their oﬀspring.
Lemma 1 Consider the new industrial sector. There exists a unique ratio of skilled to unskilled










t =0 if hm
t < (hm)∗
ns
t =0 if hm
t > (hm)∗.
Proof. As established in (8), ω0(hm
t ) < 0 and the uniqueness of (hm)∗ follows. The remaining
part is a Corollary of (14). ¤
Hence, if hm
t+1 < (hm)∗ then individuals would not have an incentive to raise unskilled
oﬀspring and the skilled to unskilled ratio will increase, whereas if hm
t+1 > (hm)∗ then individuals
would not have an incentive to raise skilled oﬀspring and the skilled to unskilled ratio will decline
till hm
t+1 =( hm)∗.
Corollary 1 If the new industrial technology is employed then hm
t =( hm)∗ and there is an in-
centive to produced skilled and unskilled oﬀspring, i.e.,
hm















t > 0 and Y
m,N
t > 0.
3.4 Aggregate Labor Allocation
Since preferences are such that both goods are consumed in every period, in autarky both goods
must be produced in every period. Hence an equilibrium in the goods market requires that, in a
given technological state, the demand for the agricultural and the industrial goods given by (11)
and (12) equal the supply of the two goods given by (1)-(4).
Lemma 2 If both goods are produced with the old technology
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Proof. Follows from (11)-(13), (1) and (3), noting that wu




3.5 Viability of the New Technologies
The new industrial technology will become economically viable if the value of the marginal product
of unskilled workers who use this new technology, Am
t wu((hm)∗), is at least as high as that of
unskilled workers who use the old industrial technology, am
t .
The new agricultural technology will become economically viable if the value of the marginal
product of unskilled workers who use this new technology, ptAa
t is at least as high as the return




















t is given by Lemma 2.
Proof.( a ) Y
m,N
t > 0 if the marginal productivity of unskilled labor in the new industrial sector
is at least as high as in the old industrial sector. Hence part (a) follows from (6) and Corollary 1.
(b) Y
a,N
t > 0 if the marginal productivity of unskilled labor in the new agricultural sector
is at least as high as in the old agricultural sector. Hence part (b) follows from (5). ¤
4 The Time Path of Macroeconomic Variables
4.1 Technological Progress
Suppose that the technological progress, gt+1, that takes place between periods t and t +1i s






m then there is indeterminacy in the choice of how many skilled and unskilled oﬀspring
to produce. This indeterminacy can be resolved by assuming that ceteris paribus parents prefer educated children.
The indeterminacy resolves itself after one period in any case as technology progresses.




= g(ht,N t), (15)
where g(ht,N t) is an increasing concave function (gi(ht,N t) > 0a n dgii(ht,N t) < 0,i = et,N t),
and g(0,N t) > 0 ∀Nt > 0 .37 Furthermore, consistent with historical evidence, it is assumed
that in the post-industrial revolution era human capital contributes to technological progress
signiﬁcantly more than population size (i.e. g1(ht,N t) À g2(ht,N t)).38 Hence, for a suﬃciently
large population size, the rate of technological progress between time t and t + 1 is a positive,
increasing, strictly concave function of the size and level of education of the working generation at
time t. Furthermore, the rate of technological progress is positive even if the proportion of skilled
labor is zero.
Suppose that the productivity levels in each sector are functions of the technological level
in the economy as a whole.39 Namely, the productivity of the old and the new technologies in the









where, dAj/dλ > 0a n ddaj/dλ > 0,j= a,m.
The productivity parameters are restricted so as to assure that the process of technological
progress is consistent with its historical patterns:
















where N0 > 0 is the initial size of the adult population.40
37It should be noted that we assume that, for a suﬃciently small population, the rate of technological progress
is strictly positive only every several periods. That is, for a suﬃciently small Nt > 0,g (0,N t) ≥ 0,g i(et,N t) ≥ 0,
for all t, and g(0,N t) > 0,g i(et,N t) > 0, for some t. Furthermore, the number of periods that pass between two
episodes of technological improvement declines with the size of population. These assumptions assure that in early
stages of development the economy is indeed in a Malthusian steady-state. Clearly, if technological progress occurred
in every time period at a pace that increased with the size of population, the growth rate of output per capita would
always be positive, despite the adjustment in the size of population.
38This formulation accords with the recent account of Mokyr (2002), that argues that a transition from luck based
innovation to purposeful innovation took place after the period of Enlightenment. See Kremer (1993) as well
39This formulation of technological progress that captures the spirit of a GPT, simpliﬁes the analysis considerably.
40The last equality follows from Lemma 2.
22(b) The advancement in the productivity of the industrial sector is higher than that in the agri-








dλt > 0; limλt→∞
Aj(λt)
aj(λt) = ∞ j = a,m. (A2)
Condition A2 ensures that a more technologically advanced economy has a comparative advantage
in the industrial good43.
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t )∗)γ−1 ∀t ≥ (ta)∗,
where (L
a,0
t )∗ which is the level of employment in the old agricultural sector necessary for the old
agricultural sector alone to satisfy the total demand for agricultural products at time t.
The existence of time periods (ta)∗ and (tm)∗ is derived in the appendix. In order to
simplify the determination of factor prices, the new agricultural technology is assumed to become
economically viable before the new industrial technology, i.e.,
(ta)∗ < (tm)∗, (A3)
This assumption assures that the static structure of the model resembles the Ricardo-Viner
trade model. In any period wages of skilled and unskilled workers are determined by either
the constant marginal productivity of unskilled labor in the old industrial sector (prior to the
41These assumption is consistent with historical evidence that suggests that productivity in the agricultural sector
grew less rapidly than in the industrial sector over the late part of the 18th century and the entire 19th century. In
particular, sectoral productivity growth in the UK in the period 1780-1860 was estimated by Donald N McCloskey,
(1981) to be 1.8% in the Modernized sector and 0.45% in the agricultural sector. The gap was revised downward by
C .K n i c kH a r l e y( 1 9 9 9 )w h oe s t i m a t e dp r o d u c t i v i t yg r o w t hi nt h eM o d e r n i z e ds e c t o rt ob e1 . 2 %a n d0 . 7 %i nt h e
agricultural sector.
42Despite the fact that modern production technology is not employed over a certain period of time, the advance-
ment in knowledge permits the advancement in the productivity of this potential technology to be faster than the
older one. For instance, early vintages of the steam engines were very ineﬃcient and thus were not used. However,
advancement in knowledge permitted this technology to advance rather rapidly and to become eﬀective. Hence, the
advancement in the latent technology is via learning by doing in the laboratory rather than in the industry.
43As follows from (9), condition A2 also has the implication that the relative price of the agricultural good is
monotonically increasing over time. Evidence suggests that the relative price of agricultural goods rose over the
period 1880-1920 and declined over the period 1920-1990. (Caselli and Coleman (1999)). This pattern can be easily
matched if the cost of acquiring skills would vary over time. In particular, if the cost of acquiring skills is increasing
through time, (i.e. τ
s/τ
u is increasing with λ.), the relative price of agricultural goods could decrease over time.
This, in the context of the current model, the assumption of a ﬁxed τ
s/τ
u is a reasonable simplifying assumption
that has no qualitative implication on the main thesis.
23employment of the modern agricultural technology), or the constant marginal productivity of
unskilled workers in the agricultural sector (once the modern agricultural technology is used). As
established in Appendix B, the qualitative result would not be aﬀected is this structure will not
be imposed.
4.2 Human Capital Accumulation
The proportion of skilled labor in the adult population at time t +1 ,ht+1, depends only on the
technological level λt+1, as follows from (14), Lemma 2 and (A3). Parents’ fertility decisions in the
period t are based on their rational expectation of the relative wage rate of skilled and unskilled
labor in the period t+1,w u
t+1/ws
t+1, which in turn depends on the level of technology in the period
t +1 , λt+1.44 Hence,
ht+1 = h(λt+1), (17)
4.3 Population Dynamics
The size of the adult population in period t +1 ,Nt+1, depends on three variables: the adult
p o p u l a t i o ni np e r i o dt, Nt, the income level and income distribution of the adult population in
period t, which are determined by λt, and the demand for skilled and unskilled workers in period
t +1 , which are determined by λt+1. Hence,
Nt+1 = n(λt+1,λt,N t). (18)
5 The Evolution of the Economy
The evolution of the economy is determined by dynamical system given by equations (15) and
(18), noting (17). This section analyzes the evolution of the economy through qualitatively distinct
stages as the new agricultural technology becomes economically viable and subsequently the new
industrial technology becomes economically viable. As will become apparent in the ﬁrst stage
the economy is in a Malthusian epoch. Ultimately due to technological progress the economy
experiences a take-oﬀ to a modern industrial stage, where the transition between the two stages
population growth ﬁr s tr i s e sa n dt h e nf a l l s .
44T h eq u a l i t a t i v ea n a l y s i sw o u l dn o tb ea l t e r e di ft h eg r o w t hr a t eo ft e c h n o l o g yw o u l da ﬀect the return to human
capital. As is established in Appendix B, if the agricultural technology remains land-intensive then it is the rate
of growth of technology that is vital. Although the threshold and the rate of growth models are theoretically
distinct mechanisms, they are both consistent with the same set of facts i.e. a growing rate of technological change
occurring alongside an increase in the rate of human capital accumulation and a non-monotonic relationship between
population growth and income.
245.1 The Malthusian Stage
In early stages of development (i.e., t<(ta)∗) the new technology in both sectors is not economi-
cally viable. The economy is in a state where individuals are constrained in their choices by the
subsistence consumption constraint. The share of the agricultural sector in production is thus
higher than in subsequent stages and the budget share of manufactured goods is lower. Since
the new industrial technology is not economically viable, there is no demand for skilled labor and
there is thus no human capital accumulation. The rate of technological progress is therefore slow
since gt+1 = g(0,N t). This accords with stylized facts for Europe before the industrial revolution,
see Maddison (1982, 1995).
Population Dynamics in the Malthusian Stage
In the Malthusian stage since the new production technology in the industrial sector is not
economically viable there is no demand for skilled labor. Parents therefore only rear unskilled
children. The old agricultural production technology has a ﬁxed factor of production - land - and
so there are decreasing returns to scale to labor. Thus for a given level of technology, as population
rises, the land-labor ratio falls, and wages fall. As stated in Lemma A1 in the appendix, under
reasonable conditions this will be a stable process whereby population tends to a steady state level
for a given level of technology.
Technological progress has no eﬀect on the real wage rate, wt/pt = aa
t(L
a,0
t )γ−1, and just
allows for a larger level of population. Technological progress initially causes output per worker to
increase which in turn increases wages and fertility and causes the population to rise. The average
product of labor thus falls and in the absence of further technological progress, real wages fall
back to the long run level of e c(1 − α − β)/[(1 − α − β) − (1 − α)τu].
5.2 The Population Expansion Stage
In intermediate stages of development (i.e., (ta)∗ <t<(tm)∗) the new technology in the industrial
sector is not economically viable and hence there is still no demand for skilled labor. Parents thus
only rear unskilled oﬀspring. The market equilibrium is very similar to that in the Malthusian
stage except that in this stage the new agricultural production technology is economically viable
and the wage rate of unskilled labor is therefore ptAa
t.
The important diﬀerence between this stage and its predecessor is that the Malthusian check
on the economy is no longer present. In this stage increased population does not reduce the real
wage and so from this point onwards the unskilled wage rises with the level of technology. As
follows from (11), (12) and (13) the budget share devoted to fertility and manufactured goods will
25increase and the population increases throughout this stage according to the equation
Nt+1 =
(1 − α − β)





5.3 Industrialization and Demographic Transition
In advanced stages of development (i.e., t>(tm)∗ > (ta)∗) the new industrial technology is
economically viable and there is a demand for skilled labor. The ratio of skilled to unskilled labor
employed in the economy at time t +1 ,ht+1, is determined by the fertility decisions of the adult
agents in period t, which are based on the expected relative wage rates of skilled and unskilled
labor in period t +1 ,w u
t+1/ws
t+1, and also by the demand side of the economy.
As established in Lemma A3 in the Appendix, there is a unique market clearing level of
ht+1 for all values of λt+1 and the level of ht+1 is non-decreasing in λt+1. The Lemma presents
the initial case where λt+1 is such that both skilled and unskilled workers will be constrained by
the subsistence constraint. The analysis for the subsequent case where unskilled workers will be
constrained by the subsistence constraint but skilled workers will not, follows trivially from this
analysis.
In this stage there is thus a self-reinforcing relationship between technological progress and
the human capital intensity of the economy which causes both the rate of technological progress and
the level of human capital accumulation in the economy to rise. From equation (15) an increased
level of ht increases λt+1 and from Lemma A4 an increase in λt+1 increases ht+1. This process
creates two opposing forces on the population growth rate as the following section describes.
Population Dynamics in the Stage of Demographic Transition
The growing levels of technology and skill intensity apply two conﬂicting pressures on the
rate of population growth. On the one hand they increase in the wage level which leads to an
increase in the budget share of manufactured goods which in turn raises the demand for skilled
workers and so tends to lower the fertility rate since τs > τu. However on the other hand increases
in the wage level allows more resources to be devoted to raising children which exerts a positive
inﬂuence on the fertility rate. The number of skilled and unskilled oﬀspring produced in this stage
is derived in the following Lemma whereas Corollary 2 establishes the conditions under which
fertility has the inverted ‘U’ shaped relationship with income per capita as has been observed in
many developed economies.
Lemma 4 If the new technologies are economically viable in both sectors, and if the subsistence
constraint is binding for skilled and unskilled workers in period t +1 , then under symmetry, the
26number of skilled oﬀspring, n
i,s
t , and unskilled oﬀspring, n
i,u
t of individual i in period t is deter-
mined by
(i) The total number of oﬀspring ni
t, of an individual i, i = u,s, is,
ni
t =
(1 − α − β)(1 − pt+1e c/wi
t+1)(1 + ht+1)
[(1 − α)(τu + ht+1τs)]
.































t [τu +ht+1τs]. This together with the ﬁrst
order condition, equation(13) implies condition (i) ¤
This Lemma demonstrates, as stated above, that there are two opposing forces on the
population growth rate in this stage of development. On the one hand the increase in the wage
level leads to an increase in the budget share of manufactured goods, which raises the demand
for skilled workers. Since τs > τu, this exerts a negative inﬂuence on the fertility rate. On the
other hand the increase in the wage level also allows more resources to be devoted to raising
children which exerts a positive inﬂuence on the fertility rate. The following Corollary shows that
it is possible to restrict parameters so that fertility has an inverted ‘U’ shaped relationship with
i n c o m ep e rc a p i t ao v e rt i m e .
Corollary 2 If the new technology is economically viable in the manufacturing sector, the rate of
population growth will eventually fall towards a lower level if (1 − α − β)(1 + ˜ h)/(τu + ˜ hτs) is
suﬃciently small and positive, where ˜ h =( βhm)∗/[(α + β)(1 + (hm)∗)+α(hm)∗((τs − τu))/τu)].
Proof. As λt+1 increases real wages increase and eventually no agents will be bound by the
subsistence constraint. In this case condition (ii) of Lemma 4 becomes ni
t =( 1− α − β)(1 +
e h)/(τu +e hτs). ¤
5.4 The Modern Industrial Stage
When the level of technology rises suﬃciently for the subsistence constraint not to bind for any
agent, the economy reaches a state where the population growth rate and the skill intensity of the
economy are constant. Since no agent is bound by the subsistence constraint, the budget share
27devoted to manufactured goods and the level of human capital accumulation will be higher than
in the previous stages and from Corollary 2 the fertility rate will be low. This implies that growth
will also, ceteris paribus, be higher given the properties of gt+1 = g(ht,N t) given by Lemma (15).
Proposition 1 If the new technologies are economically viable in both sectors and neither skilled
nor unskilled workers are constrained by the subsistence constraint, the economy is in a state of
balanced growth with a constant population growth rate and skill intensity.
Proof. As follows from (11) and (12), the demand ratio ptca
t/cm
t = α/β. Thus using the structure
of the analysis in Lemma A2, the unique equilibrium level of ht+1 equals e h, where e h is the constant
deﬁned above in Corollary 2. Furthermore, following the analysis in Lemma 4, using (13), the
total fertility of all agents is given by n =( 1− α − β)(1 + e h)/(τu + e hτs). ¤
Corollary 3 If the new technologies are economically viable in both sectors and neither skilled
nor unskilled workers are constrained by the subsistence constraint, the budget share devoted to
manufactured goods and the level of human capital accumulation will be higher than in the previous
stages and the fertility rate will be lower.
Proof. This follows from the ﬁrst order conditions, equations (11), (12) and (13), Lemma A4
and Corollary 2. ¤
6 International Trade and the Process of Development
This section analyzes the eﬀect of international trade on the transition of economies from a Malthu-
sian epoch, through a demographic transition, to state of sustained economic growth. The anal-
ysis demonstrates that international trade accelerates the transition of technologically advanced
economies to a state of sustained growth, whereas it prolongs the transition of less advanced
economies to a state of sustained economic growth, perhaps indeﬁnitely.
6.1 Comparative Advantage
Suppose that the world economy consists of two economies that are identical in every respect
except for their level of technology. In particular, economy A is more technologically advanced
than economy B and therefore possesses better advanced technologies for the production of the
industrial good as well as the agricultural good, i.e.,
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Furthermore, since technological progress in the industrial sector is faster than in the agricultural
sector, the industrial technology is relatively more advanced in economy A, and the technologically















6.2 Autarkic and Trade Equilibrium
Suppose that international trade does not take place prior to the stage in which the new production
technologies become economically viable. As established above, since technological advancement
is biased towards the industrial sector, the autarkic relative price of the agricultural good, pA, in
the technologically advanced economy A, is higher than the autarkic relative price of the agricul-
tural good, pB, in the less technologically advanced economy B. That is, as follows from (9) and
Corollary 1, once the two advanced technologies are economically viable in both economies, i.e.,
[Y
a,N
t ]i > 0a n d[ Y
m,N


















As international trade is established between the two countries, the international equilibrium
relative price of the agricultural good, p∗
t, is determined in between the autarkic equilibrium prices,
pA
t and pB





6.3 Patterns of Specialization
International trade therefore causes each of the countries to specialize relative to their position in
autarky. Furthermore, it follows from (20) and (21) that one of the economies completely special-
izes in production. (If pB
t <p ∗
t <p A
t , the two economies completely specialize in production).45
From the viewpoint of the technologically advanced economy, A, there is reduction in the relative
price of the agricultural good, and producers are induced to produce more of the industrial good.
From the viewpoint of the less advanced economy, B, there is an increase in the relative price of the
agricultural good and producers are induced to produced more of the agricultural good. Interna-
tional trade, therefore induces Country A to specialize in the production of the industrial, skilled
intensive, good, whereas Country B is induced to specialize in the production of the agricultural
good.
6.4 Trade and Population Growth
The eﬀect of international trade on the patterns of specialization in production in period t,a ﬀects
the demand for skilled and unskilled labor in the two economies in period t, and generates an
advanced supply response from parents who are taking decisions about the optimal number of
skilled and unskilled children to raise in period t − 1 in light of the expected rate of return for
skilled and unskilled workers in period t.
Proposition 2 If the world economy is opened to international trade:
(a) The rate of population growth of the technologically advanced economy, A, is aﬀected
negatively
(b) The rate of population growth of the technologically less advanced economy, B is aﬀected
positively.
45This determination of the patterns of comparative advantage by this semi-Ricardian structure is consistent with
recent evidence provided by Antonio Estavadoerdal and Alan M. Taylor (2002) which shows that the Heckesher-Ohlin





t , international trade increases necessarily the production of the skilled
intensive industrial good in economy A (even if the economy remains diversiﬁed). The ratio of
skilled workers in the economy [ht]A would increase and since the production of skilled children
requires more time, the rate of population growth declines. In particular, if p∗
t <p A
t then economy
A completely specializes in the production of the industrial good, [hm
t ]A =( hm)∗ and as follows




t , international trade increases necessarily the production of the unskilled
intensive agricultural good in economy B (even if the economy remains diversiﬁed). The ratio of
skilled workers in the economy [ht]B would decline and since the production of unskilled children
requires less time, the rate of population growth rises. In particular, if pB
t <p ∗
t then economy B
completely specializes in the production of the agricultural good, [hm
t ]B = 0 and as follows from
Lemma 1, population growth increases. ¤
Population growth in the two economies prior to the demographic transition is aﬀected
positively by the aggregate resources of the economy and negatively by the rate of return to
human capital. The eﬀect of international trade expedites the demographic transition in the
technological advanced economy, A, whereas it slows it down in the technologically less advanced
economy, B.
Proposition 3 If the world economy is opened to International trade
(a) The demographic transition of the technologically advanced economy, A, is accelerated
(b) The demographic transition of the technologically less advanced economy, B, is delayed,,
perhaps indeﬁnitely,
Proof. As established below in Proposition 4, international trade widens the technological gap
between the advanced and the less advanced economies. The relative income of economy B in the
world economy depends on its rate population growth relative to that of the advanced economy A.
If the share of income of economy B in the world economy falls over time then economy B could
completely specialize in agricultural production, and the economy would never generate a demand
for skilled workers and would therefore not experience a demographic transition. Alternatively if
31the relative share of income of economy B in the world economy rises over time then ultimately the
output of the manufactured good from economy A will be insuﬃcient to meet world demand, and
economy B would begin demanding skilled workers and eventually would experience a demographic
transition. For economy A international trade increases the rate of technological progress and
thereby the demand for skilled labor, accelerating the demographic transition. ¤
6.5 Trade and the Technological Gap
This initial eﬀect of international trade on population growth will persist, and the initially less
advanced economy will become even relatively less advanced through time.
Proposition 4 International trade widens the technological gap between the advanced and less
advanced economies.
Proof. As follows from (15), the increased in the proportion of skilled workers [ht]A in the
technologically advanced economy increases the rate of technological progress in the economy,
whereas the reduction in the proportion of skilled workers [ht]B in the technologically less advanced
economy, decreases its rate of technological progress. Since g1(ht,L t) À g2(ht,L t) the proposition
follows. ¤
Corollary 4 International trade reinforces the initial patterns of comparative advantage.
7C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This research argues that the Great Divergence in income levels across countries as well as the
current distribution of world population can be attributed, in part, to the contrasting eﬀects
that the rapid expansion of international trade in the second phase of the industrial revolution
played in the timing of the demographic transition in industrial and non-industrial countries. In
industrial economies international trade enhanced the specialization in the production of skilled
intensive goods and stimulated technological progress. The rise in the demand for skilled labor
induced an investment in the quality of the population, expediting the demographic transition,
stimulating technological progress and further enhancing the comparative advantage of these in-
dustrial economies in the production of skilled intensive goods. In non-industrial economies, in
32contrast, the specialization in the production of unskilled intensive goods that was brought about
by international trade reduced the demand for skilled labor and provided limited incentives to
invest in population quality. The demographic transition was therefore delayed, increasing further
the abundance of unskilled labor in these economies and enhancing their comparative disadvan-
tage in the production of skilled intensive goods. International trade has therefore widened the
gap between the technological level as well as the skill abundance of industrial and non-industrial
economies, enhancing the initial patterns of comparative advantage and generating sustained dif-
ferences in income per capita across countries. The gains from trade were channelled towards an
increase in population in non-industrial economies and an increase in the income of the existing
population in industrial economies.
In contrast to the literature on the dynamics of comparative advantage the focus on the
interaction between population growth and comparative advantage generates an important new
insight regarding the distribution of the gains from trade. It suggests that even if trade aﬀects
output growth of the trading countries at the same rate (due to the terms of trade eﬀect), output
per capita may diverge since in one of the countries the growth of output will be generated
primarily by population growth.
The asymmetric eﬀect of international trade on the timing of the demographic transition in
developed and less-developed economies, and its persistent eﬀect therefore on the initial patterns of
comparative advantage, may suggest that the rapid transition of the currently developed economies
into a state of sustained economic growth is associated with the slow transition of less developed
economies into a state of sustained economic growth.
The theory is compatible with the case in which the patterns of specialization are not
determined by market forces but rather by the interaction between colonial forces and international
trade (e.g., Acemoglu at al. 2003). Colonialism reinforced the adverse eﬀect of international trade
on the process of industrialization of less developed economies, depressing the demand for human
capital and enhancing the incentive to convert the gains from trade into population growth rather
than into an increase in output per capita.
The economic history of the UK, India is consistent with the thesis that international trade
played a signiﬁcant role in the timing of the demographic transition and in the process of indus-
33trialization. Historical evidence suggests that during the nineteenth century the intensive trade
relationship between India and the, technologically superior, UK led to a regression in industri-
alization in India and acceleration in industrialization in the UK. Whereas the UK experienced
an impressive increase in the level of education throughout the 19th century and a demographic
transition towards the end of the century, in India the demographic transition has been delayed
and its comparative advantage in the production of labor-intensive goods has been enhanced.
The proposed model abstracts from several factors that are relevant for the assessment of
the eﬀects of international trade on population growth and the process of development in less de-
veloped economies. Cultural and institutional diﬀerences between countries in the determination
of population growth, public provision of education, and in the process of technological change
would be reﬂected in the timing of their demographic transition and in their patterns of compar-
ative advantage. Moreover, the adverse eﬀect of international trade on industrialization and thus
on the timing of the demographic transition could have been mitigated by the positive eﬀect of
trade on technological diﬀusion across countries (e.g., Ronald Findlay, 1996). However, as argued
by Clark (1987) labor productivity in this period diﬀered greatly across countries even among
industries in which technologies were very similar across the globe.46 M o r e o v e r ,s i n c et h er a t eo f
technological diﬀusion depends upon the appropriateness of factor endowments in the receiving
country,47 the adverse eﬀect of trade on the factor endowment of less developed economies would
slow down the rate of technological diﬀusion.
The near completion of the demographic transition in most countries in the world, along
with the acceleration in technological diﬀusion and the changes in the nature of international
trade and its eﬀect on the return to human capital, suggest that although trade may have had an
adverse eﬀect on the earlier process of industrialization in less developed countries, the conventional
beneﬁcial forces that are associated with international trade have denominated in recent decades.
46In particular, Clark (1987) shows that despite the fact that in 1910 textile machinery was uniform around the
world, labor productivity was ten times higher in advanced countries than in the less developed ones.
47See, Susanto Basu and David N. Weil, 1998, Joseph Zeira, 1998, and Daron Acemoglu and Fabrizio Zilibotti,
2001.
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Lemma A1 In the Malthusian stage, if technology is stationary, the population will converge to a
steady state level, if (i) (1−α−β)/τu > 1, (ii) γ > 1−
(1−α)




Proof. As follows from Lemma 2 and the individual’s optimization, the population dynamic in
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Condition (i) of the Lemma ensures that when agents are unconstrained and are rearing only
unskilled children, the population is rising. Noting the properties of the old agricultural production
technology (1), the economy will eventually be in a state where its agents are constrained by the
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]] ∈ (−1,1),
provided that the initial level of population is not so large as to cause the initial average product
of labor to be below the subsistence level, as guaranteed by condition (iii). ¤
Lemma A2 Under A1, A2,




t ≥ 1/[wu((hm)∗)] ∀t ≥ (tm)∗.






t )γ−1 ∀t ≥ (ta)∗.
Proof.
(a) Follows from (A1), (A2) and Lemma 3 noting that g(0,N t) > 0 ∀Nt.




to the constant level of e c(1 − α − β)/[(1 − α − β) − (1 − α)τu] ≡ ˜ wu. However since Aa
t is rising




0 )γ−1. For (ta)∗ <t<(tm)∗
it follows from (13) that population will be higher than it would have been in the Malthusian
35regime. Therefore the shadow Malthusian unskilled wage given by aa
t((L
a,0
t )∗)γ−1,48 will be below
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still holds since the demand for agricultural goods will be at least as high as it would have been
without any new technologies49, and thus the shadow Malthusian unskilled wage will be below the
level ˜ wu. Finally for t>(tm)∗∗ , the demand for agricultural goods will be growing at the rate of
Aa, which is a greater rate than would be occurring under the Malthusian system. Thus again the






t )∗)γ−1 still holds.¤
Lemma A3 When both sectors’ new technology is economically viable and both skilled and un-
skilled workers will be constrained by the subsistence constraint in period t+1, there exists a
unique market clearing level of ht+1 which will be rationally expected by agents making their
period t fertility decisions
Proof. Deﬁning the number of unskilled agents working in agriculture as, NA
t ,a n di nm a n u -
facturing as, NM
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where we know from equation 13 that in equilibrium lu
t = β/(1−α)+((1−α−β)/(1 −α))e c/Aa
t,
and ls
t = β/(1 − α)+( τu/τs)((1 − α − β)/(1 − α))e c/Aa
t.
We also know from Corollary 1 that Ht =( hm)∗(lu
t /ls
t)NM
t and that by deﬁnition NA
t +
NM
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Given Aa
t this expression is a constant. Since Aa
t+1 is a function of λt+1 which is forecastable given
period t information, the Lemma follows. ¤
48Where as deﬁned above, the variable (L
a,0
t )
∗ is the level of employment in the old agricultural sector necessary
for the old agricultural sector alone to satisfy the total demand for agricultural products at time t.
49For some parameter speciﬁcations the fall in fertility caused by the introduction of the new industrial technology
may reduce fertility so much and for so long that the population falls below the level it would have attained if the
economy had continued on its Malthusian path without the new technologies. If this occurs then we cannot rule






γ−1 rises above A
a. We regard this as a highly unlikely and very counterfactual.
Based on McEvedy and Jones’s (1978), the population of the British Isles grew from 5 million in 1500 to 10 million
in 1750. If growth continued at this rate then the current population of the British Isles would have been 20 million,
much below its current actual level of approximately 60 million). Hence, the population at the beginning of the
modern industrial stage is assumed to be greater than it would have without the existence of the new production
technologies.
36Lemma A4 The proportion of skilled workers in the adult population in the economy at time t,
ht, is non-decreasing in the level of technology, λt. When some agents are constrained in
their decisions by the subsistence constraint ht is increasing in the level of λt. When no
agent is constrained by the subsistence constraint ht is a constant and is unaﬀected by the
level of λt.
Proof. This follows from the agents ﬁrst order conditions, equations (11), (12) and (13). They
imply that for all constrained agents the higher their wage the larger their budget share devoted
to manufactured goods. Thus an increase in λt implies that the equilibrium ratio of the value of






















t are deﬁned above in Lemma A3. Thus for a given Nt,t h el e v e lo fNM
t must
rise which also implies an increase in the level of Ht since ls
t is non-increasing in λ.
When agents aren’t constrained equations (11), (12) and (13) show that the budget share
of manufactured goods is unaﬀected by λt and so increases in λt have no eﬀect on ht. ¤
Appendix B
This appendix demonstrates that the qualitative results would not alter if the production
technology in the agricultural section remains land-intensive.
If the economy is characterized by 3 production technologies: an old agricultural technology,
described in (1) and an old and new industrial technologies described in (3-4) one would need to
replace Assumption A1-A3 with a stronger set of assumptions so as to assure that the techno-
logically advanced economy would have a comparative advantage in the production of industrial
goods.
In the three-technology model, the relative price of the agricultural good in terms of the























The productivity parameters are restricted such that in addition to (A1) and (A2)
The productivity of the new industrial technology advances more rapidly than that in the
agricultural technology,namely i.e.,
Am(λ)
Aa(λ) = Kλ where K>1a n ds o l i m λt→∞
Am(λt)
Aa(λt) = ∞ ((A3’))
This implies that the technologically advanced economy will have a comparative advantage in the
industrial sector if K is suﬃciently large.
The advancement in the productivity of the agricultural sector, Aa
t,with λt is such that, at
some point e t where Nt = e N and ht = e h the rate of technological progress rises suﬃciently high





> [(1 − α − β)/τu](1−γ) for all
λt+1
λt
= φ(ht,N t)w h e r eht ≥ e h and Nt ≥ e N ((A4’))
In order to assure that the pattern of trade is consistent with historical patterns will assume
that K is suﬃciently large for pA
t >p B
t , when the two economies begin to trade.
Lemma A5 Economy A has a comparative advantage in the industrial good if K is suﬃciently
large.






















Thus the inequality will hold for a suﬃciently large value of K. ¤
The rest of the results are established straightforwardly subject to (A1), (A2), (A3’) and
(A4’).
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